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TOWARD A THEOLOGICAL CONSTRUCT FOR




The prophets of the Old Testament were not always the most popular
people in society. They often spoke of the future as being in stark con-
trast to present societal standards. Such biblical visionaries generally
commented on serious and fundamental concerns, such as how to live
one's life properly. At times, these commentators clashed with the pre-
vailing governing entities and unremarkably were treated to relatively un-
pleasant ends. In the discipline of bioethics, several theologians proffered
their concerns, which, in retrospect, proved rather prophetic. Faced with
the fundamental challenge to humanity which the emerging genetic tech-
nologies posed, Karl Rahner, Joseph Fletcher, and Paul Ramsey offered
their own analyses of the morality of these nascent scientific and medical
technologies from which today's legislators and judges may benefit.
Occasionally, governments, as with the audiences that the prophets ad-
dressed, are faced with fundamental challenges that rise from the depths
of such ontological' concepts as human nature,2 the determinative mo-
* B.A., Georgetown University, 1989; J.D., The Catholic University of America. Co-
lumbus School of Law, 1994. The author wishes to thank his parents for their uncondi-
tional support and to express his gratitude to Professor George P. Smith, II for his insights
and comments.
1. Ontology can also be described as a philosophical or existential concern with "be-
ing." See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETH-
ics 36 (3d ed. 1989). Legal questions approach an ontological study, for example, when
attempting to decipher when human life (or "being") begins, when "personhood" can first
be ascribed to a "being," and when the life of the subsequent person no longer exists at a
level commonly associated with "personhood." Webster's Dictionary defines ontology as
"the branch of metaphysics concerned with the essence of things [and] the study of being."
THE NEW WEBSTER'S COMPREHENSIVE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 701
(Deluxe ed. 1987).
2. See Scott C. Idleman, The Role of Religious Values in Judicial Decision Making, 68
IND. L.J. 433 (1993). The author notes that in difficult cases, the court must consider "ulti-
mate moral determinations about the nature of human beings or about the nature of their
relationship to one another, to the state, and to the global community." Id. at 435. See
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ments which delineate life and death,3 or the parameters of personhood.4
Legislatures, confronted with such divisive issues, must struggle with the
diverse complications which emanate from these fundamental questions.
Regrettably, in response to these issues, a government will attempt to
accomplish through power and force5 what it has not been able to resolve
through trenchant analysis of its own social, political, economic, and ethi-
cal systems. In the end, a people affords true legitimacy to a government
when that government applies the law which is warranted in a particular
situation and which is also consonant with the prevailing social mores and
values.
6
When faced with ontological challenges,7 however, the law must as-
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), where the Supreme Court upheld Georgia's
criminal anti-sodomy statute as applied to homosexuals. Did not the Court declare essen-
tially that such acts were in violation of human nature? Id. at 190-94.
3. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). The Supreme
Court examined the status of a human being in a persistent vegetative state and held that a
limited constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining or life-saving medical treatment exists.
Id. at 278.
4. See Roe v. Wade,.410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Supreme Court held that a constitu-
tional right, based on privacy, exists and permits a woman, with the aid of her physician, to
have an abortion. However, the Court also held that the right can be circumscribed by the
state in the final trimester. Although the Court did not attempt to "resolve the difficult
question of when life begins," id. at 159. the decision, nonetheless, implicates such issues.
5. A perusal of any widely circulated newspaper quickly confirms this observation as
reports of "ethnic cleansing," genocide, and civil war predominate headlines. On a less
political note and more philosophical level, Walter Kaufmann, the noted commentator on
the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, explains that if human beings do not have a firm
grounding in the fundamental values that provide meaning to human life, the state or gov-
ernment can inject its own values as seen in Hitler's Germany, Fascist Italy, and other
ideology-driven countries. Kaufmann notes that:
The ancient theological picture of man is gone. If we cannot discover a new pic-
ture of man that will again give him a sense of his essential dignity, the State, in
the hands of military despots, will demand that we should yield to it in idolatry;
and eventually men will lose all respect for one another, all social structures will
break down, and men will seek only to rob and to exploit one another.
WALTER KAUFMANN, NIETZSCHE: PHILOSOPHER, PSYCHOLOGIST, ANTICHRIST 167 (4th ed.
1974).
6. Law must have some relationship to the society it governs and must change with
the values of the governed. For example, Roberto Unger, a noted jurisprudence commen-
tator in the Critical Legal Studies movement, explains that differing conceptions of the
basis of social order provide a framework for the analysis of law. To illustrate this point,
Unger refers to a consensus theory of jurisprudence which focuses on society and "its
shared values and understandings" as opposed to the individual. In consensus theory,
therefore, "the main reason for which laws are obeyed is that the members of the group
accept in belief and embody in conduct the values the laws express." ROBERTO UNGER,
LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 24-31 (1976).
7. The courts and legislatures deal with "ontological challenges" when considering
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sume a more interdisciplinary approach in analyzing such fundamental
concepts if it is to retain its legitimacy. Just as our government had to
grapple with the fundamental nature of personhood when attempting to
resolve the abortion and euthanasia dilemmas, legislatures and courts
must once again examine such concepts when faced with the challenges
the New Biology presents.' This Article maintains that when dealing
with the "hard cases" mentioned above, it is appropriate for the law to
draw upon such fields as ethics, philosophy, medicine, and even theology,
when fashioning a legal construct by which society can resolve pragmati-
cally these essential questions.9 The goal, under circumstances posed by
the New Biology, is to produce an application of the law which is harmo-
nious with society's concept of the common good.' ° By injecting other
curative disciplines into the legal analysis of such problems, a government
can build a broader consensus among those that it governs. This consen-
sus, in turn, promotes a greater respect for the law and a healthier society
which is not fractured by bitter disputes over the law or its results.
As a product of the New Biology, the Human Genome Initiative (Initi-
ative) is an attempt to map the fifty to one-hundred and fifty thousand
genes that comprise the overall biological portrait of a human being.1'
The Initiative presents the law with several fundamental challenges. The
aspiration of this Article is to explicate for the law a-construct which em-
ploys theological analysis 2 as a complement to other disciplines for the
the "hard cases" of abortion, physician-assisted suicide, and the autonomy-based position
of the "right to die." See Idleman, supra note 2, at 434 (stating that the courts, in these
circumstances, are focusing "on ethically difficult cases, or other so-called 'hard cases"').
8. The "New Biology" refers to any type of revolutionary, technologically advanced,
experimental, or visionary medical treatment or therapy. See Roderic Gorney, The New
Biology and the Future of Man, 15 UCLA L. REV. 273, 304 (1968); GEORGE P. SMITH 1I,
THE NEW BIOLOGY: LAW, ETHICS, AND BIOTECHNOLOGY (1989).
9. For example, one author has noted that "[e]xclusive reliance should not be placed
on legal remedies, however, to resolve the complex ethical problems that biomedical re-
search presents." GEORGE P. SMITH, II, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW: MEDICAL, SOCIO-
LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL DIRECTIONS FOR A BRAVE NEW WORLD 14 (1993).
10. As St. Thomas Aquinas noted in his Treatise on Law of the Summa Theologiae,
"[L]aw has as its first and foremost purpose the ordering of the common good." ST.
THOMAS AQUINAS ON POLITICS AND ETHICS 45 (Paul E. Sigmund ed. & trans., 1988)
[hereinafter AQUINAS]. See generally George P. Smith, II, Manipulating the Genetic Code:
Jurisprudential Conundrums, 64 GEO. L.J. 697 (1976).
11. SMITH, supra note 8, at 6.
12. This Article maintains that mapping all of the genes that control the basic func-
tions of human life implicates questions concerning the fundamental nature of humanity.
Analogously, theology, in its quest to determine the fundamental nature of the human
spirit.in relation to God, can serve as a guide to the law just as ethics, science, medicine,
and other disciplines do in appropriate situations.
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purposes of resolving these fundamental quandaries of the Human Gen-
ome Initiative. When applied, such a construct will aid the law in estab-
lishing the parameters of scientific and medical research without stifling
beneficial applications of the New Biology.
In drawing from the theological realm, a construct for the analysis of
bioethical challenges should strive toward flexibility. The construct
should neither restrict itself exclusively to principles found in natural
law' 3 nor, at the other pole, contain only consequentialist or utilitarian
principles.'" In seeking a middle ground between such poles, the result-
ing construct draws upon a priori or universal principles' 5 which are tem-
porally conditioned by the ever evolving nature of biomedical science.
The construct, therefore, employs a paradox. While maintaining a justi-
fied deference to universal principles of human nature (the ontological
principles), the construct approaches the problems of the New Biology
with a flexibility that recognizes how principles can evolve under the
pressures of current conditions.
The Initiative endeavors to map the a priori biological existence of the
human being. The use of such a map to aid in both somatic and gametic
genetic therapy,' 6 as well as other genetic-based medical technologies,
13. For the purposes of this Article, principles of "natural law" are developed within
the context of St. Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas discusses the kinds of law in his Question 91.
AOUINAS, supra note 10, at 46. There exists eternal law, which is the governance of the
universe by divine reason. Natural law is simply the manifestation of the eternal law in
natural or living beings: "[lIt is evident that all things participate in the eternal law in a
certain way because it is imprinted upon them through their respective inclinations to their
proper actions and ends." Id. See also JOHN C. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS:
CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 295-336 (1960). Murray focuses
upon natural law's "metaphysical character" and its primary concern with "the ultimate
order of beings and purposes." Id. at 320. Such notions of natural law accordingly consist
of universal, transcendent, and timeless principles. Id.
14. Consequentialist theory analyzes ethical problems according to the outcomes or
consequences of particular decisions. THE NEW GENETICS AND THE FUTURE OF MAN 81
(Michael P. Hamilton ed., 1972). Consequentialist theory is subsumed within the broader
field of normative ethics. "Normative ethics is concerned with determining what actions
and states of affairs are right, wrong, good, or bad, and with related evaluations such as
praiseworthiness and blameworthiness." MICHAEL H. SHAPIRO & Roy G. SPECE, JR.,
BIOETHICS AND LAW 73 (1981).
15. A priori principles are founded upon the concept that some acts are inherently
unethical or immoral. THE NEW GENETICS AND THE FUTURE OF MAN, supra note 14, at 81.
16. Somatic therapy consists of treating a disease, caused by incorrect genetic coding,
through the substitution of the incorrect genetic code with the correct genetic code. Be-
cause such treatment only affects the individual cells of the patient, the patient's gametic or
sex cells would need to be altered to prevent the genetic predisposition toward the disease
from passing to the patient's offspring. Gametic or germ-line therapy consists of the altera-
tion of defective genes in the sperm (male) and ova (female) to prevent the transmission of
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implicates the very essence of human nature. The challenge referred to
above is simply stated: Should the courts and the legislatures permit sci-
ence and medicine to, in effect, manipulate human nature through the use
of this genetic map or blueprint? 7 A flexible, interdisciplinary construct
for decision-making, anchored in ethical and theological principles, an-
swers this challenge with a cautious "yes." It remains then for the courts
and legislatures to decide, after considering many disciplines, including
theology, how far the genetic mission may delve into human existence.
Part I of this Article discusses the general background of the Initiative,
as well as the technological and medical offshoots of the Initiative, such as
genetic therapy (both somatic and gametic), various methods of experi-
mentation, and research associated with genetics. Part II examines the
need for the law to assume an interdisciplinary approach to solving the
questions that arise from the Initiative. Accordingly, this part of the Arti-
cle asserts that theological principles have a modest, albeit critical, role to
play in the legal construct. Part III of the Article commences with a gen-
eral discussion of basic theological principles the Initiative evokes, and
specifically explores these principles in the realm of genetic therapy. The
works of three prominent thinkers, the late Catholic theologian, Karl
Rahner, the late Protestant ethicist, Joseph Fletcher, and the Protestant
theologian-ethicist, Paul Ramsey, provide the basis for the theological in-
gredient of the construct. Part IV concludes the Article by formulating a
construct, in part derived from the above theological principles and au-
thors, by which the law can address the fundamental challenge posed by
the Initiative and genetic therapy: the extent to which technologies of the
New Biology should be permitted to manipulate and experiment with the
basic genetic composition of the human being.
unfavorable genes to the offspring. John C. Fletcher, Moral Problems and Ethical Issues in
Prospective Human Gene Therapy, 69 VA. L. REV. 515, 515 (1983); Alexander M. Capron,
Which Ills to Bear?: Reevaluating the "Threat" of Modern Genetics, 39 EMORY L.J. 665,
675-77 (1990). "
17. Several governmental regulatory groups have concluded that somatic cell therapy
does not deviate much from any other kind of medical therapy. However, any alteration of
the germ-line or gametic cells would not be allowed as such alteration would affect future
offspring. Capron, supra note 16, at 675. Obviously, manipulation of the sex cells has
impact on future generations whereas somatic cell therapy simply corrects an aberrant
gene within the cells of only one patient. Id. at 675-77.
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I. THE HUMAN GENOME INITIATIVE: MYTH, MONSTER, OR
MIRACLE
18 .
A. The Human Genome Initiative-"Our Fate is in our Genes"1 9
The Initiative is a plan to map and sequence the fifty to one-hundred
and fifty thousand genes20 that comprise the genetic blueprint of a human
being.21 Genetic mapping consists of the laborious process of matching
the position of genes onto specific chromosomes. 22 Once the map is com-
plete, scientists, physicians, and the public can "screen" for both benefi-
cial and deleterious genetic attributes.23 Screening an individual's genetic
map theoretically will enable scientists and physicians to predict and pre-
vent potential genetic disasters.24 The medical purpose of mapping and
sequencing the human genome is to target specific, disease-related genes
18. See George J. Annas, Mapping The Human Genome and The Meaning of Monster
Mythology, 39 EMORY L.J. 629 (1990) (drawing from literary examples of humanity's
desire to create and control life or human nature).
19. James Watson, the co-discoverer of DNA and the Chief Administrator of the
National Institute of Health's Human Genome Initiative, quoted in Annas, supra note 18,
at 638. Watson further noted that "when finally interpreted ... the genetic messages
encoded within our DNA molecules will provide the ultimate answers to the chemical
underpinnings of human existence." Id.
20. Annas, supra note 18, at 629. There are approximately three billion base pairs of
nucleotides that make up the twenty three different chromosomes that compose the
human genome. Id. at 635. Chromosomes are composed of genes (50,000 to 100,000 in
humans), which in turn are composed of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), the chemicai car-
rier of genetic information. Id. DNA is composed of the base pairs of nucleotides which
are found in two linear strands wrapped around each other in the form of a double helix.
Id. Genetic mapping, the nuts and bolts of the-Initiative, consists of sorting through the
genes and assigning them to specific chromosomes. Id. Ultimately, by. knowing which
gene is responsible for a particular disease and where the gene is located among the
twenty-three pairs of chromosomes, scientists can treat the aberrant gene and eradicate the
disease. Id.
21. The Initiative in the United States is composed of three organizations which are
providing the funding for the project: the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Depart-
ment of Energy (DOE), and the Howard Hughes Medical Institute. Id. at 637.
22. Id. at 636. The position of the gene on a particular chromosome constitutes a
genetic locus or "marker" which encodes for specific traits. Id. With the aid of markers,
the inheritance of traits or genetic diseases can be pinpointed to specific genes thereby
allowing scientists to attempt genetic therapy on the particular genes. See Robert M.
Cook-Deegan, Mapping the Human Genome, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 579, 581 (1991).
23. See generally Kimberley Nobles, Birthright or Life Sentence: Controlling the
Threat of Genetic Testing, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2081 (1992) (maintaining that, with the ability
to map genes responsible for genetic disorders, the potential for discrimination and inva-
sion of privacy exists).
24. See Louis J. Elsas, II, A Clinical Approach to Legal and Ethical Problems in
Human Genetics, 39 EMORY L.J. 811, 826 (1990). Elsas notes that "[t]he power of genetics
as a tool in health care is that of prediction and prevention." Id.
Theological Construct for the New Biology
for future therapy,25 as well as to identify normal genes for the purposes
of augmenting scientific knowledge.
With such potential knowledge, courts and legislatures are faced with
the challenge of producing an environment which promotes beneficial re-
search yet curbs unethical26 forays into human existence. As will be dis-
cussed in greater detail in Parts II and III of the Article, theological and
ethical principles, as utilized by the decision-makers (courts and legisla-
tures), can provide standards that will help ensure the proper balance
between producing beneficial research and maintaining the ethical integ-
rity of the human being.
B. Genetic Therapy
27
The map of the human genome will enable scientists to locate the full
complement of genes which control virtually every aspect of human de-
velopment.28 Once these genes are identified, geneticists can attempt to
alter genes that are either deleterious to the individual or insert genes
that will enhance the individual's overall genetic profile.29 Genetic ther-
apy occurs in two forms, depending on the type of cells altered.3a When
somatic cells, which compose an individual's tissues and organs, are
changed, the genetic result occurs only in the altered cells of the individ-
ual and such alterations are not inheritable. 31 Gametic genetic therapy,
on the other hand, is designed to alter genes both in the individual and in
the individual's offspring by changing the gametes which are the male
sperm and female ovum.
32
25. See Cook-Deegan, supra note 22, At 581.
26. One to three percent of the three billion dollar budget is earmarked to investigate
the Initiative's ethical implications. See Edward J. Larson, Human Gene Therapy and the
Law: An Introduction to the Literature, 39 EMORY L.J. 855, 863 (1990).
27. Genetic therapy, as discussed above, falls under the broader field of genetic
engineering. Genetic engineering is the chemical manipulation of the genetic information
contained in the cells of an organism which causes biological alterations. JUDITH AREEN ET
AL., LAW, SCIENCE, AND MEDICINE 2,(1984). See also GEORGE P. SMITH, II, GENETICS,
ETHICS, AND THE LAW i (1981).
28. See SMITH, supra note 27, at i.
29. Cook-Deegan, supra note 22, at 584-85. The author comments that the genetic
map of an individual affected with a particular disease will enable physicians to isolate the
gene which is triggering the disease. Id. at 584. The gene itself codes for a protein which,
when isolated, can be further studied to discern which defect exists in .the protein that
causes the disease. Id. Once this molecular defect is isolated, the gene coding for the
protein can be replaced with a normal copy by means of genetic therapy. Id. at 585.
30. Fletcher, supra note 16, at 515.
31. Capron, supra note 16, at 675-76.
32. Id.
1995]
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Somatic cell therapy, as it does not affect the genetic make-up of future
offspring, closely resembles other types of beneficial and therapeutic in-
vasive processes, and accordingly poses, less of an ethical problem than
gametic therapy. 33 By targeting specific disease-causing genes, such ther-
apy can relieve the suffering caused by inherited genetic disorders. The
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (Commission) has concluded
that somatic therapy can be pursued, provided that it does not alter the
gametes of the individual.34
As the Commission has done, several other groups have drawn a dis-
tinction between somatic and gametic or germ-line therapy because ma-
nipulation of the genes of offspring, as well as the individual's cells,
presents a more serious problem. As some have maintained, germ-line
therapy contains "the risk of perpetuating any errors made into future
generations of nonconsenting 'subjects'. . . [and] also go[es] beyond ordi-
nary medicine and interfere[s] with human evolution., 35 For these rea-
sons, some groups have called for a moratorium on the genetic therapy of
gametic cells.36
Such concerns stem from the notion that when technologies can affect
future generations, broader issues arise, such as actively manipulating
human identity and redefining the meaning of human nature. 37 Once
again, when deciding these issues, courts and legislatures must consult a
diverse body of knowledge and avoid relying solely upon science or legal
precedent.38 For example, it may be argued that correcting genetic defi-
ciencies is simply another means of therapeutic medical practice and does
not deny the ability or choice of procreation. Nonetheless, if executed
without ethical and moral constraints, modern genetic therapy can be uti-
33. Several guidelines have been suggested for somatic therapy: (1) scientists should
be reasonably sure that the therapy will be beneficial; (2) scientists must be able to limit
the therapy to the targeted cell; and (3) such therapy will not cause serious harm to the cell
or the offspring. See generally Fletcher, supra note 16, at 535-36.
34. See Capron, supra note 16, at 675.
35. Id.
36. At the Fifth Summit Conference on Bioethics in Rome in April, 1988, the French
delegate Jean Dausset "urged that a formal moratorium be imposed on genetic engineering
of human germline cells." Id. at 678. Dausset's proposal was rejected, but not without the
statement that, "there are neither medical indications nor ethical justification for inten-
tional genetic manipulation of human germ-line cells at this time." Id. (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 677.
38. See Larson, supra note 26, at 858 (stating, "Djust as [Judith] Areen concluded that
,scientists alone should not control human genetic therapy,' so [Alexander] Capron adds
that the [germ-line] technique is too important to leave solely to the politicians").
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lized in an oppressive and discriminatory fashion which contradicts basic
theological tenets. Before deciding whether or not to limit reproduction
through genetic therapy, the basic sanctity of human life must be inte-
grated into the equation. This Article asserts that it is possible to im-
prove human life through such therapy and yet maintain the sanctity of
life. The quality of life is improved through such therapy because the
individual's cells or offspring are genetically more viable, suffering is
greatly relieved, and society benefits by avoiding increased costs of care.
C. Issues Related to Genetic Therapy
Two of the most recent and controversial issues related to genetic ther-
apy are embryo experimentation and cloning. Each has provoked vehe-
ment rebukes from both ethical and religious circles. Both procedures
incorporate genetic manipulation but also implicate such volatile issues as
abortion and embryo discard. Postconception, preimplantation screening
of embryos, and genetic therapy on embryos 39 is one step removed from
germ-line therapy. Through the techniques of in vitro fertilization
(IVF)4 ° embryo freezing, and embryo biopsy, human embryos can be
screened for genetic defects before they become implanted in the uterus
of the mother.4 1 Preimplantation screening42 of embryos is in its prelimi-
39. A zygote is the single cell which contains the genetic information from both the
male and female parents but has not yet begun the process of division to form new cells.
Once the zygote begins to divide, the organism is termed an embryo. After the embryo has
implanted and grown in the uterine wall for approximately six weeks, the embryo becomes
a fetus. See John R. Harding, Jr., Beyond Abortion: Human Genetics and the New Eugen-
ics, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 471, 474 (1991).
40. In vitro fertilization (IVF) entails the removal (surgical or through inducement) of
eggs from a woman's ovary and the subsequent "test tube" fertilization with the male
sperm. Through the process of IVF, physicians can genetically manipulate the egg of the
mother or the sperm of the father before fertilization takes place (germ-line or gametic
therapy). Alternatively, once fertilization is achieved, the physician could genetically ma-
nipulate the resulting zygote or embryo. See John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and
Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939,
947-49 (1986).
41. John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Human Genetics, 39 EMORY L.J. 697,
705 (1990). The article focuses upon the screening capabilities of this technique and notes
that such "advances will enable couples to avoid the birth of a child with a serious genetic
defect without undergoing pregnancy and a later abortion." Id. The author then notes that
"[i]t will also eventually allow gene therapy to occur." Id.
42. The practice of screening early embryos for defects and then deciding whether or
not to abort is a controversial topic. While most people accept prenatal diagnosis and
abortion for serious genetic defects, there is more widespread opposition to prenatal diag-
nosis and termination of pregnancy for what are perceived as less serious, treatable, or
trivial genetic complications. See Dorothy C. Wertz & John C. Fletcher, Fatal Knowledge?
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nary stages. 43 Once the embryo is screened for any potential genetic de-
fects, genetic therapy can be conducted to remove the deleterious genes
and insert the normal or healthy gene sequence. 4 Because such screen-
ing, experimentation, and therapy involve the manipulation of embryos
which may eventually develop into a fetus, criticism of such procedures
has arisen.41 Some state laws already prohibit using certain genetic tech-
nologies and experimental gene therapy on embryos. 46 Such bans, how-
ever, function not only as an impediment to scientific progress, but also
neglect the duty to improve the overall health of the present and future
population.47 For example, genetic research on embryos would clearly
benefit the population because over fifty percent of conceptions which
result in spontaneous miscarriage occur because of chromosomal imbal-
ances.48  Not only Would screening and experimentation thus help
Prenatal Diagnosis and Sex Selection, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1989, at 21; Curt
S. Rush, Genetic Screening, Eugenic Abortion, and Roe v. Wade: How Viable is Roe's Via-
bility Standard?, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 113, 114 (1983) (noting that, with the scientific ability
to genetically screen for defects, coupled with the right to choose to abort, disturbing eu-
genic practices may result).
43. Robertson, supra note 41, at 705. Professor Robertson comments that the techni-
cal requirements of isolating the embryos, sampling blastomeres (which are recently di-
vided zygotes), and assaying their genetic structure have not yet reached a level of
sophistication necessary for the purposes of experimentation. Id.
44. Id. at 706. See also Nobles, supra note 23, at 2086 (noting that one advantage of
preimplantation embryo screening is that it avoids abortion because once a genetic defect
is discovered, the embryo need not be transferred to the uterus, thus avoiding an actual
pregnancy).
45. See Cook-Deegan, supra note 22, at 589-90 (noting that the use of genetic screen-
ing, testing, and therapy may result in an increase in abortions); see also Fletcher, supra
note 16, at 519 (asserting that the above-mentioned technologies have become "inextrica-
bly linked to the abortion issue"); see also Rush, supra note 42, at 114 (discussing and
defining the concept of eugenic abortion as "an abortion to prevent the birth of a defective
or malformed child").
46. Seven states prohibit experimental gene therapy on embryos. See LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:122 (West 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (West 1992); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12J (West 1983); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.2685-.2692 (West
1992); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14.02.2-01 to -02 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1 (1994);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (1990). Other issues which stem from embryo experimenta-
tion include the controversial practice of embryo discard, where the extra embryos or ge-
netically defective embryos are simply destroyed. See Robertson, supra note 41, at 707; see
generally George P. Smith, II & Roberto Iraola, Sexuality, Privacy, and The New Biology,
67 MARO. L. REV. 263 (1984). Various states have already moved toward prohibiting em-
bryo discard. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-133 (West Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 609.266-.268 (West Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. §1.205 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
47. Elsas, supra note 24, at 834 (commenting that "[tihere are clear scientific and pub-
lic needs to continue fetal research utilizing molecular genetic techniques").
48. Id. Other research beneficial to the study of the reproductive sciences would be
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couples avoid the trauma of miscarriages, such therapy could also lead to
a healthier general population.
The ultimate goal of any cloning technology is to produce a copy of a
cell or to produce offspring possessing the same genetic material as that
of the parent cell or organism.4 9 Because cloning human beings conjures
up a myriad of horrific science fiction scenarios °50 geneticists and repro-
ductive technology specialists have primarily limited themselves to the
cloning of various livestock.51 However, recent studies have reported
breakthroughs in the cloning of human embryos. Using a technique
known as "embryo splitting,, 52 researchers at George Washington Uni-
versity Medical Center in Washington, D.C., cloned cells from human em-
bryos for the first time; however, the researchers emphasized that cloning
human beings is still only a distant possibility.53 Cognizant of the contro-
versy surrounding embryo research, and seeking to avoid the specter of
experimentation on a future fetus, the researchers utilized genetically ab-
normal embryos that would have been discarded because they could not
have reached viability.54 Cloning presents an additional ethical problem
experimentation with cells from aborted fetuses. This could aid in targeting the defective
genes which cause other genetic disorders. Id.
49. George A. Hudock, Gene Therapy and Genetic Engineering: Frankenstein Is Still a
Myth, But It Should Be Reread Periodically, 48 IND. L.J. 533, 549-50 (1973).
50. See, e.g., Michael D. Lemonick, Cloning Classics, TIME, Nov. 8, 1993, at 70.
51. J. Madeleine Nash, They Clone Cattle, Don't They?. TIME, Nov. 8, 1993, at 68 (not-
ing that the cloning of certain animals had been accomplished in the early part of the
1980s).
52. In the process of embryo splitting, scientists first produce an embryo through in
vitro fertilization (IVF). IVF consists of combining the sex cells (egg and sperm) of the
parents in a Petri or culture dish. Once a sperm penetrates the egg and produces an em-
bryo, the embryo is then implanted in the uterus of the mother. In embryo splitting, how-
ever, once the embryo divides, the protective coating around the cells, known as the zona
pellucida, is removed, and the cells of the embryo are separated. After the cells are sepa-
rated, an artificial zona pellucida is again placed around the cells to restart the process of
cell division and growth. Kathy Sawyer, Researchers Clone Human Embryo Cells, WASH.
POST, Oct. 25, 1993, at A4; Boyce Rensberger, The Frightful Invasion of the Body Doubles
Will Have To Wait, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1993, at A3.
53. Sawyer, supra note 52, at A4. Although the experiment at George Washington
University Medical Center caused much controversy last summer, cloning remains a dis-
tant possibility. During the development of an embryo, certain genes within the cells
either turn on or off, depending upon the embryo's stage of development. Thus, im-
planting a fully developed cell from another organism precludes further division because
this new embryo contains genes which, although responsible for future development, have
already been turned off. Rensberger, supra note 52, at A3.
54. Sawyer, supra note 52, at A4. These particular embryos were abnormal because
the eggs had been fertilized by more than one sperm cell and thus had excess genetic
material. Id.
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because during the first group of cell divisions, the cells are "totipoten-
tial" and thus have not attained a level of development in which certain
cells or groups of cells code for specific functions.55 Accordingly, any
manipulation of the genetic make-up of the cell at this stage could have
far-reaching ramifications in the ultimate development of the individual
produced by the cloned cell.
Cloning, as with other forms of genetic manipulation, presents an ethi-
cal dilemma for society. Should society allow science to tinker with the
biochemical building blocks that hold the very key to human existence?
Throughout these medical and scientific challenges, a common theme ex-
ists-society's need to balance the chance to improve the quality of life of
the population with the possibility of violating basic ethical and moral
principles. In the case of cloning, couples who have difficulty conceiving
children benefit by such therapy because the cloning of an IVF-produced
embryo produces more embryos for implantation which increases their
chances of pregnancy. In drafting legislation regarding such techniques,
ethical and moral considerations should be weighed appropriately rather
than act as ideological impediments to improving people's lives.
II. THE NECESSITY FOR AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH
A. No Law is an Island Unto Itself
A genetic map of the human being can alter how humans think of
themselves, both as individuals and as a society. A genetic map, as with
all forms of knowledge, can be used to produce benefits enjoyed by the
individual and by society as a whole. With proper deference to human
dignity, a construct which employs theological and ethical principles pre-
vents science and medicine, as well as legislatures, from overreaching and
producing a map for the purposes of controlling the individual or restrict-
ing the individual's freedom. But first, why should the law even consider
such a construct?
As the abortion debate has affected society's perception of the begin-
ning of life and produced the viability standard,56 genetic research also
has the potential to alter society's perceptions of another fundamental
55. Id. Although the researchers noted that such therapies would be developed for
the benefit of infertile couples, manipulating the cell at its "totipotential" stage would be
similar to gametic genetic therapy in that not only the immediate cell or embryo is affected,
but also any offspring which may result.
56. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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principle: personhood.57 As the secular and pluralistic society progresses,
the law cannot afford to cloister itself in its own self-contained field.58
Accordingly, the law, in its attempt to understand the implications of the
Initiative and genetic therapy, must be ever vigilant of scientific and tech-
nological advances59 and their theological and ethical"0 implications. Ul-
timately, the law must avoid the role of functioning solely as a mechanism
of control, preventing science from improving human existence, thereby,
denying autonomy, privacy, and dignity.6 ' It is for this reason that the
law must consult theological principles when developing a framework of
analysis.
B. Related Bioethical Principles
When resolving medical-legal issues it is wise to consult some generally
recognized bioethical principles that not only reflect the need for an in-
terdisciplinary approach, but also implicate theological principles. Au-
tonomy, beneficence, and justice comprise the triumvirate of ethical
principles.62 Autonomy, or self-determination, implies that individuals
should have the freedom to choose or act without actual coercion from
external forces or passive coercion resulting from an internal inadequacy
or incompetence. 63 The analogous theological value is the freedom of the
57. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics, 45 VAND.
L. REV. 313, 315 (1992). The authors note that "[glenetics has profoundly altered the per-
ception of personhood within our culture." Id.
58. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Disci-
pline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987).
59. SMITH, supra note 9, at iii-iv. Perhaps the most concise statement of the inter-
relationship of law, science, and medicine is stated as follows: "Law, science, and medicine
must become full, unlimited partners in the bioethical ventures of modern society." Id.
60. Because of the many social, ethical, and legal issues raised by genetic therapy and
research, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and its National Center For Human Gen-
ome Research established an Ethics Committee to aid in the formulation of the ethical
issues. Annas, supra note 18, at 650-51. The international Human Genome Organization
(HUGO), comprised of 42 scientists from around the world, has also formed an ethics
committee for the purposes of providing a forum for the discussion of ethical issues. Id. at
651. Perhaps the most successful of the regulatory or oversight organizations has been the
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research (The President's Bioethics Commission). Id. at 656.
61. See Fletcher, supra note 16, at 519 (arguing that "since genes are such a fundamen-
tal aspect of what makes us human, any prospect of deliberate change implies the exercise
of inordinate power by those who discover and control such knowledge").
62. See generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 194-255; see also SMITH,
supra note 9, at 6-9.
63. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 68. As this nation is a "rights"-
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human spirit.6' Beneficence can be described as "[t]he prevention of
harm and the production of good."65 The analogous theological maxim is
found in St. Thomas Aquinas' Treatise on Law: "[h]ence the first precept
of law is that good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided."66
Justice can be portrayed as "an aspirational codification of the common
good." 67 Bridging the gap between ethics and theology, justice is also
depicted as that which is morally correct.68 The ethical constructs em-
ployed have often balanced these three principles so that the end result
"of minimizing human suffering and maximizing the social good"69 is
achieved.
Judge Guido Calabresi suggests an analogous paradigm. Judge Cala-
bresi reflects that most health law issues can be analyzed according to the
extent that solutions to such bioethical issues are in conformity with con-
stitutional and societal notions of life, liberty, and equality.70 Likewise,
theological concerns are rooted in three fundamental notions: human life
can be treated as sacred, a gift from God; liberty is that element which all
human beings are duly granted out of respect for their autonomous and
free nature; equality is maintained when society recognizes the common
oriented society, autonomy often seems to take precedence over community-oriented val-
ues of justice.
64. Karl Rahner notes that humanity's basic freedom is not simply a choice between
objects. Freedom is best described as the individual spirit's choosing his or her own total
identity-in Rahner's words, "self-choice." KARL RAHNER, THEOLOGICAL INVESTIGA-
TIONS VI, 181-88 (Karl-H. Kruger & Boniface Kruger trans., 1969). Rahner comments
further by noting, "Freedom is the inevitable necessity of self-determination, by which man
... makes himself what and who he wants to be and ultimately will be .... A RAHNER
READER 271 (Gerald A. McCool ed., 1975).
65. SMITH, supra note 9, at 8. See also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at
194-95 (noting that beneficence is "the obligation to confer benefits and actively to prevent
and remove harms").
66. AouINAS, supra note 10, at 49.
67. SMITH, supra note 9, at 6. A corollary of justice known as distributive justice im-
plies the distribution of benefits justly and fairly among various social groups. Id. at 9. For
example, the proper allocation of the benefits of genetic therapy would be included in an
analysis of whether a genetic policy was "just."
68. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 257. Further connoting theological
concerns, justice also is manifest in the protection of the vulnerable. SMITH, supra note 9, at
9.
69. SMITH, supra note 9, at 6. Other sources also acknowledge that the principles are
balanced or harmonized to produce a just result. "No one principle is supreme, but all are
to be considered together." Elsas, supra note 24, at 815.
70. Dean Guido Calabresi, Yale Law School, Address at the Journal of Contemporary
Health Law and Policy Annual Banquet (Apr. 8, 1994). At the time of his remarks, Judge
Calabresi was Dean of Yale Law School. President Clinton appointed Judge Calabresi to
the U.S. ,Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1994.
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bond between all of God's creation and refuses to denigrate one popula-
tion for the benefit of another.
C. Justifications for Employing Theological Principles
Theological principles, in the form of religious values, have contributed
to American jurisprudence throughout this nation's history.71 Many au-
thors note that the Constitution itself was substantially infused with theo-
logical beliefs concerning the nature of human beings and their existence
in society.72 In various substantive due process cases, the Supreme Court
intimates theological values as the Court explores the nature of human
sexuality,73 the existence of human life,74 and the nature of death.75 It is
especially appropriate in these "hard cases" for judges and legislators to
consider theological values because these issues are the focus of theo-
centric thinking.76 Therefore, theological values provide the law with
guidelines that are axiomatic to understanding the very issues that are the
genesis of these "hard cases."77
71. See Harold Berman, The Interaction of Law and Religion, 31 MERCER L. REV. 405,
406 (1980); Timothy L. Fort, A Jurisprudence of Faith: An Experiment in Using Theology to
Interpret Jurisprudence, 30 CATH. LAW. 22 (1985).
72. See Frank S. Alexander, Symposium: Religious Dimensions of American Constitu-
tionalism, 39 EMORY L.J. 1, 1-8 (1990).
73. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that there is no constitutional
right to engage in homosexual sodomy). Former Chief Justice Burger noted in his concur-
rence in Bowers that "[clondemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in Judeao-Chris-
tian moral and ethical standards." Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
74. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that there is a constitutional right to
undergo an abortion; however, abortions can be restricted by the 'states .in the second and
third trimesters). Regardless of the fact that the Court decided not to "resolve the difficult
question of when life begins," id. at 159, the issue is prevalent and embodies the very root
of the abortion debate.
75. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (establishing that
there is a limited constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining or life-saving medical treat-
ment); see George P. Smith, II, Death Be Not Proud: Medical, Ethical and Legal Dilemmas
in Resource Allocation, 3 J. CONTEMp. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 47 (1987).
76. It is in these "hard cases" that judges (and legislators drafting the laws in question)
seldom have strong precedent upon which to rely and thus must consider supra- or extra-
judicial sources (whether explicitly or implicitly acknowledged in the text of the opinion).
See, e.g., George E. Garvey, Book Review, 33 CA'TH. U. L. REV. 801, 801 (1984) (reviewing
MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982)). Pro-
fessor Garvey notes that it would be "shocking, however, for the courts to refuse to con-
sider the moral teachings of religious traditions when making moral value judgments." Id.
at 805.
77. See Richard S. Myers, The Supreme Court and the Privatization of Religion, 41
CATH. U. L. REV. 19, 24 (1991). The author notes that "accepting a public role for religion
enables religious institutions to contribute significant resources and insights regarding
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III. THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS AND SOURCES
A. Which "Map" of Human Nature?
The map of the human genome can be seen as a quest for the existen-
tial meaning of human nature on a biological level. As James Watson,
one of the discoverers of the double helix structure of DNA stated,
"[w]hen finally interpreted ... the genetic messages encoded within our
DNA molecules will provide the ultimate answers to the chemical under-
pinnings of human existence."78 Once the entire map is procured, who is
to decide which genetic profile is "normal" or "defective"? Who is to
decide, and by what standards, the value of one genetic profile over an-
other? Ultimately, when any type of genetic policy is implemented, the
decision-maker inherently makes a value judgment on the genetic profile
of the individual or embryo.79 What value does the decision-maker as-
sign to the embryo encoded for the disease of cystic fibrosis? If genetic
markers are found that implicate a predisposition toward alcoholism or
homosexuality, what value is assigned to these individuals? Analysis of
such values need not always be executed under the calculus of utilitarian-
ism, which may view certain individuals as economic burdens.
80
Without making an overly broad (and unwise) claim that any use of the
map of the human genome is unethical or immoral, theological principles
remind the decision-maker to proceed with caution. First, any equation
of the individual human spirit with that of his or her genome engages in
radical reductionism and should be eschewed. 81 Such reductionism de-
tracts from the essential dignity of the individual as spirit in relation to
God.82 Second, in viewing the individual spirit or subject as merely a
product of his or her genome, the decision-maker objectifies and dehu-
moral issues." Id. See also Developments in the Law - Religion and the State, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1606, 1618-19 (1987).
78. Dennis L. Breo, DNA Discoverer James Watson Now Dreams of Curing Genetic
Diseases, 262 JAMA 3340, 3343 (1989).
79. See Capron, supra note 16, at 682-83 (noting that "deconstructionism," the philo-
sophical discipline of interpreting texts espoused by the French philosopher Jacques Der-
rida, can be applied to the "reading" of the human genome map and challenge the
conception that what is "normal" is the rule and what is "abnormal" is the exception).
80. See Rush, supra note 42, at 134-35 (stating that "it is a considerable economic
burden to both state and family to raise a child, but in the case of a severely defective child
that burden may be enormous, and often impossible to bear").
81. See Annas, supra note 18, at 648. In reflecting on the new perspectives on humans
that the human genome would bring, the author noted that "[tlhe most obvious is that
breaking 'human beings' down into six billion 'parts' is the ultimate in reductionism." Id.
82. See RICHARD A. MCCORMICK, How BRAVE A NEW WORLD 10 (1981). "The
Judaeo-Christian tradition has always seen persons as 'in relationship to God.' This means
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manizes the individual.8 3 Third, in science's race to control existence,' 4
human beings are essentially engaging in the futile attempt to deny their
finitude.85 Humanity, in all its aspirations to transcend humankind's in-
herent limitations through science and medicine, refuses to recognize
that, as God's creation, humanity is inherently and essentially good.
B. A Triumvirate of Theologians Addresses the Issues
1. Karl Rahner and the "Moral Faith Instinct"
One of the most notable theologians in Catholicism, Karl Rahner, has
described each human as a freedom event, an unfinished spiritual and
corporeal existence that creates itself into the existence the individual
desires. 86 In this creative capacity, the free individual is both experi-
menter and experiment-being part of a divine and natural design, yet
also contributing to this design.87 Accordingly, the human essence is ex-
perimentally malleable in that the individual has the freedom to construct
and to manipulate his or her existence and essence. 8 Rahner, in assess-
ing the then-emerging breakthroughs in genetic technology, noted that
"today [man] is able to manipulate himself in tangible, bodily and societal
terms, and ... he can plan this manipulation rationally and steer it by
that persons are the bearers of an 'alien dignity,' a dignity rooting in the value God puts in
them." Id.
83. See Sidney Callahan, The Challenge of Technological Change, in ONE HUNDRED
YEARS OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 174, 182 (John A. Coleman ed., 1991). The author
notes that "Imany technologies endanger human dignity by their tendency to turn a
human being into an object or thing .... Humans can be degraded by becoming enmeshed
and subsumed in a technological process." Id.
84. See JOSEPH FLETCHER, HUMANHOOD: ESSAYS IN BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 91 (1979).
"To be [human] we must be in control. That is the first and last ethical word." Id. Fortu-
nately, control is not the first and last theological word; rather it is love.
85. See PAUL RAMSEY, FABRICATED MAN: THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL 154
(1970). "The flaw in 'the human condition' lies at the heart of man's self-awareness of...
our finitude, or rather the fact that we are conscious beings aware of our limitation." Id.
86. Karl Rahner, Experiment: Man, 16 THEOLOGY DIG. 57, 58-59 (1968). Rahner
notes that "Imlan has always had the power to determine his permanent, everlasting orien-
tation." Id. at 62. Rahner sees the onset of genetic technology as providing humanity the
potential for physical self-creation as a complement to spiritual self-awareness. Id. at 58.
87.. Id. at 59. The reason for humanity's uniqueness, which separates it from the rest
of creation, is the ability to transcend its spatio-temporal existence and reflect upon its
"selfness" -its existence in the world. Id. Thus, humanity exists (is experiment) and con-
templates its existence (is experimenter).
88. Id. at 60. Rahner also notes that "[a]s far as a Christian understanding of mankind
is concerned, man is not simply the product of 'nature', as if nature alone were able and
authorised [sic] to determine and model man's being." A RAHNER READER, supra note 64,
at 270-71 (emphasis in original).
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means of technology."89 In applying this premise to genetic therapy,
Rahner initially explains that "[i]t is impossible simply to dismiss the
thought of man's 'genetic manipulation' as an unethical project."9
Rather, in a cautious fashion, Rahner suggests that the abstract concept
of genetic self-manipulation does not imply a morally repugnant act.91
Rahner reasons that because the individual's very nature consists of the
ability to create itself, such kinds of self-manipulation, genetically speak-
ing, are morally legitimate if in accord with the individual's nature.92
What then is the individual's nature against which Rahner would mea-
sure the moral quality of such manipulation? Rahner explains human
nature: the individual is spirit as evidenced by his or her subjective es-
sence; the individual is free; the individual is unique; the individual tends
toward community-building, as opposed to self-obsessing; and the indi-
vidual is worldly; that is, spatio-temporally conditioned or finite.93 Any
genetic manipulation must be in accord with the above concept of human
nature. This paradigm then functions as a backdrop to an analysis of the
moral quality of genetic manipulation.
The following three factors are considered in this analysis: (1) the
moral quality depends upon the nature of the parties engaging in the ma-
nipulation (the state, the medical profession, the informed and consenting
patient); (2) the moral quality depends upon the actual and intended re-
sult on the whole human being; and, (3) the moral quality depends upon
the technological method employed (the success as well as the humane-
ness of the method).94 Rahner summarizes the three principles into one
89. A RAHNER READER, supra note 64, at 271-72.
90. Id. at 271. Rahner further notes that "man is characteristically the being who has
been handed over to himself, consigned to his own free responsibility. In this sense he
must 'manipulate' himself." Id. (emphasis in original).
91. Id. Perhaps out of respect for the depth of genetic knowledge yet revealed at the
time of his writing in 1975, Rahner posits his critique in the negative as opposed to any
type of broad endorsement.
92. Id. at 272. Rahner explains that because humans inherently are beings that create
themselves or their identities, it is natural that humans will engage in self-manipulation. Id.
Simply because humankind now has the ability to apply genetic technology to this concept
of self-creation or manipulation does not change the fundamental, albeit abstract, notion
that human beings create themselves.
93. KARL RAHNER, THEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS II, 239-41 (Karl-H. Kruger trans.,
1963). Spatio-temporal existence is simply an existence of being present at a particular
time and place. The concept merely denotes that human beings, by their finite nature, are
shaped and molded according to the particular moment in history and particular culture in
which they find themselves.
94. KARL RAHNER, THEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS IX, 230-31 (Graham Harrison
trans., 1979).
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common factor: is the proposed manipulation or treatment "appropriate
to or contrary to the nature of man."95 Ultimately, Rahner asks, "[is
there such a thing as an unchangeable 'nature' of man against which we
can measure the appropriateness or inappropriateness of a particular ge-
netic manipulation?" 96
Next, Rahner summarizes human nature and simultaneously lays the
groundwork for his construct by which a decision-maker can analyze the
moral quality of genetic manipulation. The theologian notes that "man
has a knowledge and understanding of his own nature," and utilizing this
knowledge, the individual can make normative judgments as to particular
actions.97 It is in the difficult cases of somatic and gametic therapy or
cloning that "there exists a moral mode of knowing."98 In accordance
with humanity's nature, this knowledge is based upon universal or a pri-
ori principles (as discussed previously). Yet, at the same time, this knowl-
edge is conditioned by the particular time and culture within which the
individual resides. Rahner delineates this mode or construct of knowing
as the "moral instinct of faith, i.e. a universal knowledge of right and
wrong belief."99 The moral faith instinct becomes the focal point of
Rahner's construct for analysis and is discussed more fully in Part IV.
2. Joseph Fletcher - The Consequentialist Approach
Other thinkers also reflect Rahner's element of the human subject as a
freedom event capable of controlling his or her existence and destiny. In
contrast to Rahner, Joseph Fletcher reveals a consequentialist approach
which focuses more upon the results of particular actions, and whether
95. A RAHNER READER, supra note 64, at 273.
96. THEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS, IX, supra note 94, at 242. Rahner first appears
rather skeptical as to the possibility of delineating a neatly packaged definition of human
nature. The theologian asks, "[w]ith all our knowledge of man's immense malleability in
the biological, psychological, 'cultural and social spheres, do we still have the courage to
talk about the 'nature' of man?" A RAHNER READER, supra note 64, at 273. In terms of
the Human Genome, how far do we extend the map of what is considered normal? As
Rahner asks, "[dlo we know precisely where the limits of man's nature are to be found?"
Id.
97. THEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS, IX, supra note 94, at 231.
98. A RAHNER READER, supra note 64, at 274. Rahner highlights the notion that this
mode of knowing does not lend itself to a concrete or objective definition: "This moral
knowledge itself has a structure which is both universal and not exhaustively analysable
[sic] in conscious reflection." Id. at 275. Part of the reason for the inability to assess this
mode of knowing with scientific precision is that, as with most "moral" beliefs, such knowl-
edge is culturally-conditioned and individually instinctual.
99. Id. at 275.
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given the particular situation, the results are beneficial.' 0 The Protestant
ethicist does not employ any universal rules as with a priori-influenced
thinkers. Rather, he resorts to guidelines which can be adjusted to partic-
ular situations.101 Fletcher explains that the definitive question in analyz-
ing the ethics of genetic control is whether the decision-maker is "to
reason from general propositions and universals, or ... to reason from
empirical data, variable situations, and human values[?]' 10 2 Fletcher in-
sists that society must choose between the former a priori ethics (tradi-
tionally embodied by religious morality) or the latter consequentialist
ethics.'0 3 Fletcher opts for a pragmatic modality: "[w]e reason from the
data of each actual case or problem and then choose the course that of-
fers an optimum or maximum of desirable consequences."10' 4
Fletcher asserts that "[m]an is a maker and a selector and a designer
and the more rationally contrived and deliberate anything is, the more
human it is."' 5 In other words, how man goes about making, selecting,
and designing is not as important as the fact that man can and does make,
select, and design his existence. Again, the focus is not on universal, a
priori principles which demand certain decisions. Rather, the focus is on
the theory that it is in humanity's nature to create or manipulate exist-
ence. If that which is created or manipulated serves the social good, "the
greatest good of the greatest number,"'0 6 then the act, as well as the
means by which the act is achieved, is justified. Fletcher ultimately ar-
gues that the consequentialist approach moves the ethical analysis of the
New Biology into a quality-of-life realm as opposed to a sanctity-of-life
100. Consequentialist ethics is contrary to a priori ethics in that the former concentrates
more upon fact-specific analysis, is pragmatic and situational, and produces results from a
utilitarian-type calculus. MCCORMICK, supra note 82, at 282-83.
101. FLETCHER, supra note 84, at 4.
102. Id. at 81.
103. Id. Fletcher provides the following critique of a priori thinking: certain acts are
"always wrong intrinsically, in and of themselves, as such. Their inherent wrongness was
believed by faith and by metaphysical opinion to be a matter of 'natural' moral law or of
divine revelation .... Such 'moral laws' were presumably known to the moral agent- the
actor or decision maker-through inner guidance or intuition .... In any case, right and
wrong were determined by a religious or metaphysical or nonempirical kind of cognition."
Id. at 82.
104. Id. at 83.
105. MCCORMICK, supra note 82, at 45; FLETCHER, supra note 84, at 88. Fletcher goes
on to make, what is still considered by many critics, to be a baffling claim: "It seems to me
that laboratory reproduction is radically human compared to conception by ordinary heter-
osexual intercourse." FLETCHER, supra note 84, at 88.
106. FLETCHER, supra note 84, at 85.
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realm.1°7 This quality-of-life model focuses decision-making in biomedi-
cal dilemmas on human needs instead of human nature or rights.'0 8 Un-
fortunately, it is this "needs"-based construct that causes Fletcher's ball
of utilitarian logic to unravel into simplistic relativism. For example,
Fletcher begins one particular analysis as such: "[t]here might be a need
in the social order at large for one or more persons specially constituted
genetically [to perform some function]."10 9 Under the Fletcher para-
digm, almost any function-defined human being can be filled in at the
brackets. This analysis resolves into a blatant denial of the human spirit
as subject. Accordingly, humans are merely created as a means to an end
and, therefore, the concept of autonomy in bioethics, as well as the indi-
vidual as a free spirit in theology, is obliterated for the sake of the utility-
driven social order.
3. Paul Ramsey - The A Priori Approach
Paul Ramsey assumes a "deontological" approach as compared to
Fletcher's consequentialist mode. Ramsey, as does Rahner, sees humans
as free, truth-seeking subjects who cannot be utilized "as ... mere ob-
ject[s] of genetic or environmental determination" or as "mere ... ob-
ject[s] discovered among the contents of the science of genetics."" 0  In
describing the human being's fundamental nature, Ramsey disagrees with
the consequentialist camp by noting that the individual "will not begin
with the desired end and deduce his obligation exclusively from this
end." 1" A morally acceptable construct under Ramsey would insist that
there are "elements in the nature of man which are deserving of respect
and should be withheld from human handling or trespass.' 1 2 Ramsey's
reasoning derives from his belief in the mystery inherent within the na-
107. Id. at 88. "In any case, what is called for here, for consequentialists, is a quality-of-
life ethics instead of the sanctity-of-life ethics in the classical Western tradition." Id.; see
generally George P. Smith, II, Quality of Life, Sanctity of Creation: Palliation or Apotheo-
sis?, 63 NEB. L. REV. 709 (1984).
108. FLETCHER, supra note 84, at 89. "Needs are the moral stabilizers, not rights. The
legalistic temper gives first place to rights, but the humanistic temper puts needs in the
driver's seat." Id.
109. Id. at 85 (emphasis added).
110. RAMSEY, supra note 85, at 19.
111. Id. at 30 (emphasis in original). Ramsey continues, "[the human being] will not
define right merely in terms of conduciveness to the good end; nor will he decide what
ought to be done simply by calculating what actions are most likely to succeed in achieving
the absolutely imperative end of genetic control or improvement." Id. (emphasis in
original).
112. Id. at 31.
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ture of human beings. If science and medicine respect the mystery within
the human spirit they will proceed with caution upon the path to genetic
manipulation." 3 Ramsey continually admonishes the scientific and medi-
cal community to avoid the desire to transcend humanity's ultimate limi-
tation-death-if it is done at the expense of the human spirit." 4 For
example, Ramsey clearly differentiates between therapy and experimen-
tation, and argues that it is the latter which science and medicine should
avoid. Experimentation treats the human being as an object. It denies
the "patient" status as a person because the treatment is conducted, not
for the individual's benefit, but for the benefit of science. Genetic ther-
apy, if it can be -performed safely, would not violate Ramsey's notion of
human nature because it espouses the improved welfare of the individual
as its end." 5 Any type of genetic therapy that can reasonably predict that
no grave harm will be done to the subject (or, for that matter, the isolated
cell, zygote, embryo, or individual) and purposely intends, as its goal, the
amelioration of the subject is not only permissible, but warranted for the
purpose of alleviating human suffering.
C. Applications to the New Biology
As noted, Ramsey insists upon the protection of the individual,
through informed consent, from genetic therapy which crosses a moral
line and becomes experimentation upon the human subject. 16 The Ro-
man Catholic Church also takes an intermediate stance in its approval of
somatic genetic therapy provided "its aim is to 'ameliorate the conditions
of those who are affected by chromosonic [sic] diseases.' ,117 Fletcher, in
keeping with utilitarian principles, would also recognize a net benefit to
both society and the individual if somatic' therapy is conducted with the
consent of the patient. Rahner, in accordance with his notion of human-
113. See Paul Ramsey, Genetic Therapy: A Theologian's Response, in THE NEW GENET-
ICS AND THE FUTURE OF MAN 137, 163 (Michael P. Hamilton ed., 1972).
114. See id. Ramsey warns that 'humanity, driven by the existential awareness of its
finitude, should refrain from the "Faustian search for a yet undiscovered state of bliss." Id.
at 157.
115. See MCCORMICK, supra note 82, at 287.
116. Id. McCormick summarizes Ramsey's position in stating that, "We may never sub-
mit another human being to experimental procedures to which he cannot consent when
these procedures have no relation to his own treatment." Id.
117. JUDITH AREEN Et AL., LAW, SCIENCE, AND 'MEDICINE 175 (quoting Pope John
Paul II, La sperimentozione in biologia deve contribuire al bene integrale dell'uomo,
L'OSSERVATORE ROMANO, Oct. 24, 1982, at 2).
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kind as experiment and experimenter, would endorse somatic therapy as
long as it does not violate his "human as subject" premise.
Paul Ramsey espouses many of the theories of the Roman Catholic
Church. Compared to Fletcher and Rahner, Ramsey is the most con-
servative when examining the procreative implications of the New Biol-
ogy. The Catholic Church believes gametic therapy, cloning, embryo
experimentation, and eugenic abortion, conducted beyond the scope of
therapy or healing, impermissibly manipulate the unity of love and pro-
creation, which is reserved exclusively to the family within the context of
sacramental marriage.' 18 The Catholic Church admonishes that any ma-
nipulation of the ,reproductive process must be measured against the goal
of "harmonizing conjugal love with the responsible transmission of
life.""' 9 Paul Ramsey echoes this moral principle in his assertions that
much of this genetic technology violates the inseparability of sexuality in
marriage and procreation.
120
What follows are some examples of the unity doctrine as applied in the
above circumstances of genetic manipulation. Ramsey asserts that, in the
practice of cloning, "the conquest of evolution by setting sexual love and
procreation radically asunder entails depersonalization in the ex-
treme.'' The Church criticizes manipulation of embryos by stating,
"genetic manipulation of human embryos... [is] contrary to the human
dignity proper to the embryo." 122 In response to gametic manipulation,
the Church responds by stating, "[c]ertain attempts to influence chromo-
somal or genetic inheritance are not therapeutic but are aimed at produc-
ing human beings selected according to . . . predetermined qualities.
These manipulations are contrary to the personal dignity of the human
being and his or her integrity and identity.' 23 Even Rahner argues that
gametic manipulation, embryo experimentation, and eugenic abortion
118. See, e.g., Gaudium et Spes: Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern
World, in PROCLAIMING JUSTICE AND PEACE: PAPAL DOCUMENTS FROM RERUM
NOVARUM THROUGH CENTESIMUS ANNUS 157, 188 (M. Walsh & B. Davies eds., 1991).
119. Id. at 192. The Church 'has noted that "[mlarriage and conjugal love are by their
nature ordained toward the begetting and educating of children. Children are really the
supreme gift of marriage ..... Id. at 190.
120. MCCORMICK, supra note 82, at 286-95. Ramsey notes that the two spheres of love
and procreation are inseparable; likewise,,other authors concur with Ramsey in this by
noting the resulting dehumanization where, reproduction is separated from human sexual-
ity. Id.
121. Id. at 289.
122. The Vatican on Birth Science: 'Moral Responsibility', N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1987, at
A15.
123. Id. The Church bolsters this, argument by noting that "[elvery person must be
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separate the procreation of a new individual from the marital union.1
24
However, Rahner suggests that because modern science is yet unsure as
to when human life actually begins, any definitive statement against ga-
metic manipulation, embryo experimentation, or cloning cannot be con-
sidered as an a priori truth. 125 Conversely, Fletcher asserts that the more
rational and deliberate an act is (for example, embryo screening, manipu-
lation, and reimplantation) then the more human the act is. Therefore,
Fletcher would approve of embryo experimentation and cloning if it pro-
duced an overall benefit to society or relieved the suffering of an
individual.
126
IV. TOWARD A THEOLOGICAL CONSTRUCT
The law, aided by theological principles, must take a stand on the
moral issues which the New Biology raises. Philosophical pluralism, the
broadening scope of scientific and technological knowledge, and cultur-
ally-influenced concepts of human nature make it increasingly difficult to
reach sound moral conclusions derived from universal or a priori
principles.
The human spirit is a free spirit and has the ability to manipulate the
self to create the existence and essence desired. Because of this inherent
freedom and malleability, any paradigm or mode of analysis should as-
sume an open concept of human spirit. An intractable a priori stance is
too restrictive 127 and the consequentialist approach 28 is too flexible. Hu-
manity is too complex to be forced to choose between either unbending
and categorical rules or standardless utilitarian calculations. As a com-
promise, the balancing of autonomy and beneficence in hopes of arriving
at a just result has been marginally successful when the law addresses
bioethical quandaries. 129 However, all balancing is subject to the bal-
respected for himself: in this consists the dignity and right of every human being from his
or her beginning." Id.
124. A RAHNER READER, supra note 64, at 272-73.
125. Id. at 273.
126. See Joseph Fletcher, Ethical Aspects of Genetic Controls: Designed Genetic
Changes in Man, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 776, 780 (1971).
127. A strict a priori stance would be dissimilar to Rahner's concept of universal princi-
ples conditioned by the particular culture in which the individual must act.
128. Fletcher's position has been criticized as "structureless utilitarian calculus." Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 82, at 298.
129. See generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 50-78 (suggesting that
some of the due process decisions implicated by the abortion and euthanasia debate have
employed, albeit in a disguised fashion and with differing terminology, the principles of
autonomy, beneficence, and justice).
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ancer, the weigher of values who determines the type of justice and its
distribution and, therefore, balancing has its limitations.
The middle ground sought by the theological construct proposed here
is not one of compromise but rather one of moral correctness. This con-
struct is an application of universally recognized human values to histori-
cally and culturally conditioned situations. Similarly, natural law, which
is teleological, points the human spirit toward the inherent structure or
value in all of creation.1 30 Just as the many arrangements of genes recom-
bine to produce a unique individual in every circumstance, utilizing the
exact same biological building blocks, natural law predisposes humanity
toward the recognition that there exists fundamental, essential, and im-
mutable concepts imprinted within each individual spirit, despite the mul-
tiplicity and diversity of ethical and moral constructs. Indeed, these
ontological and a priori building blocks or fundamental values are the
same for every human being. Regardless of the particular society or his-
torical moment, aspects of human nature (human as subjects, humans as
free spirits) are constant.
How are the decision-makers (the courts and the legislatures) to decide
what these fundamental values are? Modern society, when faced with
issues such as genetic manipulation, falls upon a paradox revealed by Ar-
istotle. Justice (that which an ethical society strives toward) is part legal
(temporally, culturally conditioned human law) and part natural (univer-
sal or fundamental in nature). 31
Society can only seek to resolve this paradox and begin to make laws to
regulate genetic manipulation through what Rahner explained as a moral
faith instinct. The moral faith instinct is the "universal knowledge of right
and wrong belief.' 32 Rahner justifies use of the "instinct" concept by
asserting that an instinctive judgment derived from this universal knowl-
edge need not be adequately subject to analytic reflection. 133 Analo-
gously, even with the map of the entire human genome (perhaps the
quintessential "analysis"), science will always be unable to explain the
mystery of the human spirit and its uniqueness. As evidence of this
premise, science, for all of its "analysis," will not decipher the mind-brain
connection. As free spirits, all individuals are part mystery and, accord-
ingly, must rely on their faith instinct in arriving at solutions to such onto-
logical and essential questions as the beginning or end of life (abortion or
130. AQUINAS, supra note 10, at 46.
131. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 133 (Terren Irwin trans., 1985).
132. A RAHNER READER, supra note 64, at 275.
133. Id.
1995]
454 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 11:429
euthanasia issues), the meaning of personhood (slavery), and the existen-
tial foundation of life and procreation (genetics).
As a collective of moral beings, society cannot default on its struggle
with this instinct. For example, reliance on traditional, cultural, or histori-
cal prejudices is not a moral faith instinct. Ultimately, the challenge of
the moral faith instinct is to arrive at the universally correct or a priori
principle in the particular, historically-conditioned moment in which the
issue presents itself. Such a construct involves a paradox because it em-
ploys universal principles which are applied to particular issues, bending
or evolving accordingly yet not completely yielding to those principles.
V. CONCLUSION
A theological construct for decision-making would aid legislatures and
courts in deciding issues brought on by the New Biology precisely be-
cause these cases implicate moral and ethical issues. Resolution of such
issues, while employing such a construct, produces laws that are rooted
more firmly in the population's moral consciousness. Therefore, these
laws will gain greater legitimacy by referring to moral and ethical values
shared by the general population.
In terms of genetic manipulation of somatic cells, the theological con-
struct provides that, as with any other therapy benefitting the individual,
this type of therapy can be conferred autonomously and beneficently for
the end of justice. The triumvirate of Rahner, Fletcher, and Ramsey
would generally concur in this application of the New Biology.
Gametic genetic manipulation and the related issues of embryo experi-
mentation and cloning, appear to be "ripe" for moral faith instinct reflec-
tion. Borrowing from Rahner, the construct approaches such issues with
the concept of the human being as subject and free spirit. The decision-
maker will never know objectively whether such therapy should be per-
mitted, yet the construct directs him or her to not foreclose what may
potentially be a beneficial result.
Only an irrational fear or categorical adhesion to unchallenged princi-
ples can keep the law from employing a construct which does not fear to
struggle with the "hard cases." If the law does not employ such a con-
struct in its attempts to bring about a greater societal good, its judges and
legislators will be doomed to cowardly indecisiveness, like that by exper-
ienced by Shakespeare's Hamlet. Such tentativeness will only lead to
moral division and strife. As with the Initiative, the journey toward im-
plementing such a construct in the "hard cases" will be arduous. Yet, in
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the face of such challenging quandaries posed by the New Biology, a the-
ological construct will empower legislatures and judges to approach this
Ulyssean journey with the moral courage needed to conform the law to
both a priori principles and prevailing social concerns. In this manner,
the law will attain legitimacy and thus produce consensus and stability
instead of division and tumult.

